gifted journalists. So much so that he became known in the
West for his coverage of events, especially in Africa, even
though he was (until 1981) a member of the Polish United
Workers' Party and reported under the strictures of the Polish
Press Agency (PAP).
His specialty was revolutions, and in 1979 the revolution of the moment was in Iran, which he recounted in his book The Shah
of Shahs (1983), which again seems pertinent given what is
going on in Iran right now, not just because it is about Iran, but
because it gets at the anatomy of revolutions more effectively
than any book I know. For example he reminds us that a
revolution is not just a large political event it is one experienced by individuals, who when faced with the threat of the violence
by authorities suddenly change their standard behavior by not
being afraid. At the same time, even as revolutions are about
high ideals, individual expectations about the meaning of change are also far more mundane, like an expectation of a better job or new shoes. Finally, he points out that when revolutions succeed there is all too often a lack of practical vision, or helplessness
among the supporters, which makes revolutions vulnerable to
suppression by the powers that be on the one hand and hijacking by zealots acting in the name of the new revolutionary order on
the other. (My paraphrases do not do justice to Kapuściński's
presentation of these points, so if you haven't check out the
book).
In as much as Kapuściński was writing about a successful
revolution, the explicit story is how the Iranian Revolution
came about, and more obliquely how how the Islamic
radicals ended up taking power. Yet implicit throughout the
book is a story of what happened in Poland in the 1970s that
led to the Solidarity revolution of 1980-81, and the
disorganization among Solidarity's supporters (though I hasten
to add, not necessarily its more realistic leadership) that created
conditions that made the proclamation of Martial Law possible
without widespread active resistance.
As I write, it is very much unclear whether supporters of reform
in Iran have the power to turn anger at the stolen election, for
which a very knowledgeable observer has shown there is ample
empirical evidence, can be turned into a successful revolution.
Juan Cole (link above) seems to think Mousavi's experience of
the aftermath of the 1979 Revolution makes him unlikely to be
ready and willing to lead an outright rebellion. At the same
time, the hard-liners who are backing Khamenei cannot shut
down cell phones and internet access for very long without
disrupting the lives of their supporters. What is more the
prospect of a serious and organized rebellion once
communications blackouts are lifted may yet lead more
pragmatic conservatives to find dealing with Mousavi preferable
to continuing to back Mousavi and Supreme Leader Ayatollah
Khamenei. That result would then be akin to the Polish
roundtable talks which were provoked by the Polish Communist
leaders' decision that talking to Walesa and Co. was better than
facing the radical leaders of the wave of strikes in the Spring of
1988. At the same time, Mousavi should not be confused with
Walesa, who lead a reform movement from the outside. If there
is a comparable figure, it is probably Alexander Dubcek, who
had been an insider and leader, but as a link to the reform
movement of Prague Spring was useful to the leaders of the
Velvet Revolution, but then easily discarded, a fate that could
befall Mousavi if his opponents hold off on dealing with him
too long. But that is the optimists scenario, at least for those
on the west. The alternative is the path chosen by the Chinese
in 1989, hoping that support in the countryside and relative
lack of awareness of what supporters of Mousavi really want
will allow a the crackdown to be successful, but then
Ahmadinejad and Khamenei do not have the same positive
record on economic development to fall back on.
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